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SUMMER 1969]
THE EFFECT OF MATHIS ON RIGHT TO COUNSEL
IN TAX INVESTIGATIONS
NORVIE L. LAYt
O NE OF THE GUARANTEES granted to an individual by the
sixth amendment to the United States Constitution is the right
to the assistance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions. This right
is not limited to the presence of counsel at the 'trial itself since the
amendment provides that the accused shall have the assistance of coun-
sel for his defense. Numerous cases have been decided with reference
to the protective scope of this -right and it is now well settled that
there are many pretrial stages in the proceedings where an 'accused
is entitled to counsel. In many instances these earlier steps in the
legal process may be the time when the effective assistance of counsel
is most desperately needed and will be of the greatest benefit.' This
is due to the fact that "today's law enforcement machinery involves
critical confrontations of the accused by the prosecution at pretrial
proceedings where the results might well settle the accused's fate and
reduce the trial itself to a mere formality."2 Hence, an individual may
have a right to counsel during an arraignment,' a preliminary hearing4
or a post-indictment lineup.'
This right was extended in the landmark cases of Escobedo v.
Illinois6 and Miranda v. Arizona' to some pre-indictment confronta-
tions. In Escobedo the Court held that when an investigation begins
to focus on a particular suspect that has been taken into police custody
and where incriminating statements 'may be elicited as a result of the
interrogations, the individual is then entitled to the assistance of coun-
sel and must be so informed. In other words, right to counsel attaches
when the process ceases to be investigatory and becomes accusatory.
In Miranda the Court decided that the adversary system of crim-
inal proceedings begin whenever an "individual is first subjected to
t Associate Professor of Law, University of Louisville. B.S., University of
Kentucky, 1960; LL.B., University of Louisville, 1963; LL.M., University of Michigan,
1964, S.J.D., 1967.
1. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
2. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967).
3. Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
4. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
5. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) ; United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218 (1967).
6. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
7. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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police interrogation while in custody at the station or otherwise de-
prived of his freedom of action in any significant way."'  At this
juncture, a person being questioned must be informed of his rights
by warning "him not only that he has the right to consult with an
attorney, but also that if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to
represent him."9 This safeguard was thought essential to protect the
privilege against self-incrimination. Only by expressly and effectively
explaining this right to an individual "can there be assurance that he
was truly in a position to exercise it."'" Therefore, a person may have
to be informed of his right to counsel under the fifth amendment priv-
ilege against self-incrimination in addition to any rights under the
sixth amendment.
I. APPLICABILITY TO TAX INVESTIGATIONS
While the right to counsel has been extended to many preliminary
stages of a criminal investigation, an interesting and very important
question arises as to the point in -time of a tax investigation when
a taxpayer must be informed of his right to counsel. This common
form of governmental investigation may be somewhat unusual in the
sense that it may at different dates be a civil or a criminal investiga-
tion or may combine some features of both. The revenue agent con-
ducting the original audit may discover certain information which
leads him to believe that there may be a possible criminal violation
of !the Code. As a result, the files may be transferred to and the
investigation continued by a Special Agent from the Intelligence Divi-
sion whose function is to investigate possible criminal infractions. The
obvious fact is that various evidentiary matters might be uncovered
during the course of either the civil or criminal investigation, or both,
and these may lead to a recommendation that the taxpayer be indicted.
This problem is made even more acute by the fact that the over-
whelming majority of taxpayers will undoubtedly have no appreciation
of the role of the Intelligence Division. Even if the Special Agent
should state that he is from the Intelligence Division, it would have
little if any significance to the average taxpayer. This is in marked
contrast to the more typical criminal investigation made by a police
department where its function is usually well recognized by the person
being questioned. Notwithstanding this lack of knowledge, or perhaps
as a result of it in some instances, the taxpayer may make certain
statements or produce records and documents which he would other-
8. Id. at 477.
9. Id. at 473.
10. Id.
[VOL. 14: p. 689
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 4 [1969], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol14/iss4/8
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wise refuse to do without consulting counsel if he realized his right
to do so.
Immediately after Escobedo and Miranda taxpayers began to raise
constitutional issues about the admission of various testimony into
evidence alleging that it was secured during the investigation without
their being informed of their right to the assistance of counsel." For
the most part, the arguments seem to center on the proposition that
the taxpayer should have been specifically told, in clear and unmis-
takable terms, of his right to counsel, at least by the time the investiga-
tion was assigned to a Special Agent.'2 Most of the cases were decided
adversely to the taxpayers' contentions. The decisions were usually
premised upon the finding that the proceedings were still of the in-
vestigatory nature and were not yet accusatory" thus distinguishing
Escobedo, or that there was a lack of custodial interrogation 4 which
was present in Miranda.
There were some cases, however, where the right to counsel was
upheld.'5 The reasoning for this type of -holding was well expressed
in United States v. Turzynski 6 where the taxpayer alleged that once
the investigation became designed to secure evidence which could pos-
sibly be used against him in a future criminal prosecution, it was
incumbent upon the agents to warn him of his constitutional rights.
The court agreed stating that once "the silent transition from civil
to criminal investigation takes place in a tax case, the taxpayer being
interrogated and asked to furnish his books and records is just as
surely a prime suspect and candidate for criminal prosecution as the
individual under interrogation as a suspect for other crimes."17 There-
fore, when "a taxpayer becomes the subject of a criminal tax investiga-
tion, as evidenced by the referral of the investigation to the Intelligence
Division or otherwise, our adversary process of criminal justice has
become directed against him as a potential criminal defendant."'
11. For a discussion of some of these cases, see Andrews, The Right to Counsel
in Criminal Tax Investigations under Escobedo and Miranda: The "Critical Stage,"
53 IOWA L. Rzv. 1074 (1968) ; Lay, Right to Counsel in Criminal Tax Investigations,
43 IND. L.J. 69 (1967).
12. See Rickey v. United States, 360 F.2d 32 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
835 (1966); Kohatsu v. United States, 351 F.2d 898 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 1011 (1966) ; Bohrod v. United States, 248 F. Supp. 559 (W.D. Wis. 1965),
where this type of argument was advanced.
13. Rickey v. United States, 360 F.2d 32 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 835
(1966) ; United States v. Fiore, 258 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Pa. 1966).
14. Stern v. Robinson, 262 F. Supp. 13 (W.D. Tenn. 1966); United States v.
Schlinsky, 261 F. Supp. 265 (D. Mass. 1966), rem'd on other grounds, 379 F.2d 735(1st Cir. 1967) ; United States v. Fiore, 258 F. Supp. 435 (W.D. Pa. 1966).
15. United States v. Turzynski, 268 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. I1. 1967) ; United States
v. Kingry, 67-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9262, 19 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 762 (N.D. Fla. 1967).
16. 268 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
17. Id. at 850-51.
18. Id. at 850.
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Hence, a warning of the taxpayer's constitutional rights would be
required when the case is transferred to the Intelligence Division.
The court was not influenced by the fact that the taxpayer was
not in custody. It felt that when "the taxpayer is under suspicion of
tax fraud, the investigatory power of the government is directed
against him with the intent of developing evidence to convict him and
his need to know his rights is quite as real and urgent as that of
the suspect under custodial interrogation."1
Mathis v. United States
In Mathis v. United States"° the taxpayer was incarcerated in
prison for a completely unrelated activity when he was interviewed
by an agent from the Internal Revenue Service concerning his signa-
ture on a tax return. The taxpayer identified the tax return as his
and admitted the signature. The same process was repeated some
four months later with regard to another taxable year. After these
admissions had been obtained, the case was transferred to the Intelli-
gence Division and the taxpayer was advised of his constitutional
rights when the Special Agent sought to interview him. The taxpayer
thereafter refused to cooperate and, over his objections, the 'documents
executed 'by him during ,the two initial interviews, together with his
admission of filing the returns bearing his signature, were admitted
into evidence.
The taxpayer alleged that Miranda was applicable and that he
had not been warned of his right to remain silent; that he had not
been told that any statement he might make could be used against
him; nor had he been informed of his right to counsel. Special emphasis
was directed -toward the fact that throughout the investigation there
was a possibility that he might be charged with a criminal offense and
that he was incarcerated during the time of the interviews in question.
The court disagreed with the taxpayer's contentions and pointed
out that until the case was transferred to the Intelligence Division
it was a routine civil tax investigation. Although there may always
be a possibility that evidence of some fraud may 'be uncovered in any
routine tax audit and even though any suspect would undoubtedly be
the taxpayer under examination, the court did not consider that the
presence of either factor was enough to equate a civil tax investiga-
tion with an inquiry into an unsolved crime.
The taxpayer's incarceration on an unconnected offense was
deemed -immaterial and it did not necessitate a Miranda type of warn-
19. Id. at 854.
20. 376 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1967).
[VOL. 14: p. 689
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ing. The court held that the use of the phrase "custodial interrogation"
contemplated "the incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a
police-dominated atmosphere - interrogation incident to the investiga-
tion of an unsolved crime.'"21 Therefore, the court found that the
fact that the taxpayer chanced to be in prison at the time of the inter-
views did not cause him to be subjected to the psychological pressures
incident to the "custodial interrogation" referred to in Miranda.
While the lower court's decision might at first glance appear
beyond reproach since the divulgence of the information occurred prior
to the time the Intelligence Division entered the investigation, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari22 and reversed. 8
In reference to the fact that these questions were asked during
a routine tax investigation, the Court agreed that such examinations
may be initiated for the purpose of a civil action and, to this extent,
they might differ from investigations for other crimes. Nevertheless,
these audits might lead to a criminal prosecution and, upon this basis,
the Court rejected the argument that the Miranda requirements of a
warning to be given a person in custody were inapplicable to tax in-
vestigations. Neither was the Court impressed by 'the fact that the
questioning agents were not responsible for the taxpayer being in
custody. It was not felt that Miranda applied only to any questioning
of one who was in custody in connection with the identical case under
investigation. To so hold would negate much of the protection Miranda
intended to give.
While the Court's decision on the facts in Mathis are clear
enough, it is difficult to ascertain its application to other factual situa-
tions. The somewhat unique factor in Mathis was that of the tax-
payer's imprisonment, and the odds of 'a similar situation again aris-
ing are very remote in comparison with the total number of tax in-
vestigations. Did the Court intend to limit the Miranda type of warn-
ing to physical custody cases? There is no real inference in Mathis
as to this point but it should be remembered that Miranda not only
spoke of an individual who is taken into custody but also referred to
one who is otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant way
while being questioned by the authorities.2" This is some indication
perhaps that Miranda was really attempting to safeguard the consti-
tutional rights of an individual who, because of his deprivation of
freedom, is not capable of exercising those rights unless he is in-
formed thereof. If so, would not the necessary warning have to be
21. Id. at 597.
22. 389 U.S. 896 (1967).
23. Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
24. 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966).
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given when there is a psychologically oriented interrogation which
leads the taxpayer to feel that his freedom of movement or his alterna-
tive choice of action is being restricted in much the same fashion as
if he were physically in custody?25 This could even occur when the
taxpayer is examined in familiar physical surroundings such as his
home or office thus causing him to produce certain documents or make
various statements which might later prove to be detrimental. This
he might do simply because he was not told that he had a right to
consult with an attorney. Even if this right was known by the tax-
payer, he might be reluctant to exercise it for fear of antagonizing
-the agent thus leading to an ineffective waiver. Whatever the merits
or demerits of this line of reasoning, the Court did not pass on it in
Mathis since the taxpayer was actually in custody.
II. PosT-Mathis DECISIONS
Imbued with the prospect of success as a result of Mathis, tax-
payers continued to raise the issue of right to counsel in tax investiga-
tions with the obvious expectation that the rule there announced was
of wide application. However, this possibility has not been realized.
A. Decisions of the Courts of Appeal
One of the first cases to be heard after Mathis was United States
v. Mackiewicz, 2 decided by the Second Circuit. As i's customary
in tax investigations, the process began with an audit by an agent
from the Audit Division. After discovering that the taxpayers' bank
deposits exceeded their business income, the case was referred to a
Special Agent from the Intelligence Division. The taxpayer was in-
formed by 'the Special Agent that he could refuse to answer any
questions and refuse to produce any documents that might tend to
incriminate him but he was not told that he had a right to counsel.
The taxpayer alleged that this failure on the part of the agent violated
his constitutional rights.
His first contention was based upon the idea that when the case
was transferred to the Intelligence Division, the nature of the inquiry
had shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory state. Citing
Mathis, the court rejected this argument as attempting to create a
formalistic reliance on who was doing the investigating, i.e., civil if
by the Audit Division and criminal if by the Intelligence Division.
25. Miranda did not ignore the psychological factor. See, Id. at 448.
26. 401 F.2d 219 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 923 (1968).
[VOL. 14: p. 689
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Such a decision "would discourage the Service from having any special
investigators and it would encourage civil investigators to expand
their inquiries. 2 7
In so holding the court apparently overlooked the significance of
the taxpayer's argument. He was not contending that the title of
the investigator nor the division of the Service was material. The
important fact was that the investigation had been transferred to an
individual and a division whose function was to inquire into possible
criminal -infractions. This was the argument supporting a shift -to
the accusatory state. What conceivable difference does it make what
title either investigator be given? If the civil investigators begin to
expand their inquiry into the areas now reserved for the Special Agents,
would it be any less of an inquiry into possible criminal conduct? It
is difficult to see how it would. The taxpayer would still have to be
informed of his constitutional rights when the nature of the criminal
inquiry begins to focus on him in an accusatory manner. This is
verified by the decision in Mathis where the Court held, under the
circumstances of that case, that the taxpayer was entitled to the
Miranda warnings even during the routine investigation by an agent.
Nevertheless, the court rejected the taxpayer's argument stating that
"regardless of the official title of the agent, it would be administratively
impossible for the Service to forewarn a taxpayer every time its sus-
picions, based on changing evaluations of the changing evidence,
shifted. '28 Again this does not serve as an answer to the taxpayer's
assertion. Nothing indicates that he is asking for a warning of his
right to counsel each time the circumstances change. He merely is
claiming that he was entitled to be informed of his right to counsel
when he was interviewed by the Special Agent, not as a result of
the -title of the agent, but rather as a consequence of his function and
the fact that the inquiry was then no longer confined to the investiga-
tory stage.
Secondly, the taxpayer alleged that the agents' actions created an
impression of urgency and that they displayed their authority in such
manner as to put him on the defensive. This argument was rejected.
The court did not feel that the atmosphere created by the agents was
equivalent to an in-custody investigation since the interview was con-
ducted in the taxpayer's home, he was free to leave if he wished and
he could ask the agents to leave. While the taxpayer might technically
have this freedom of movement, it is extremely unlikely that the
average taxpayer would even consider asking the agents to leave
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for fear of placing himself in a more embarrassing position. Irrespec-
tive of whether these rights exist and irrespective of whether 'his
fears are justified, if he refuses to exercise them through fear, has he
not been deprived of his freedom of movement to the same extent as
if he were in fact in custody? In both cases, 'his confinement, psycho-
logical though it may 'be in one instance, has caused him to make
statements that might not otherwise be forthcoming.
The third contention was that the questions asked him were in-
sidious and dishonest for he had no way of knowing which answers
might tend to incriminate him. This was rejected because of the lack
of any evidence of dishonesty -on the part of the agents.
The taxpayer continued 'by asserting that even if the full Miranda
warnings did not have to be given, he was misled by the agent's ad-
vising him that he could refuse to answer incriminating questions
thus implying that he had to answer all other questions. The court
disagreed and held that the warning given did not necessarily convey
the impressions claimed by 'the taxpayer and it was not unfair to
the -taxpayer. While it may be true that such an implication does
not automatically follow the type of warning given, it is just as true
that it could follow in a number of instances. The average taxpayer
has had very little contact with investigative agencies and there is
little reason to suppose that he will be sophisticated enough to ap-
preciate his 'constitutional rights relative to such an investigation.
He may be far more likely to believe that such rights include only
those mentioned by the agent. This is just as logical as any supposi-
'tion that he will not be misled by such partial advice.
The court then concluded that the taxpayer, by cooperating with
the agents, knowingly and intelligently waived whatever rights he had.
While a taxpayer may certainly waive any rights, it is difficult to
see how he can do so knowingly if he did not know the rights existed.
Such knowledge is essential to an intelligent waiver.
Perhaps indicative of the court's feeling are some statements made
before responding to the taxpayer's contentions in a more specific
manner. The court noted that if the Miranda warning had to 'be in-
jected at this stage of the proceedings, it would merely clutter an
already difficult administrative task. This might be true of the Miranda
warning 'being required at all, but this is immaterial. The deprivation
of constitutional rights cannot be justified 'by the fact that their pro-
tection might prove to be somewhat time-consuming nor t'hat such
protection would disrupt the habits of administrative agencies.
The court went on to 'add that if such warnings are required,
"the Service might have to supply financially indigent taxpayers with
[VOL. 14: po. 689
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attorneys to assist and advise them ' 20 and that this would obviously
"hinder the efficient collection of our taxes."3 Again, ,such reason-
ing appears irrelevant. The convenience and efficiency of the Internal
Revenue Service does not outweigh the constitutional rights of a tax-
payer and such reasoning should have absolutely no bearing upon
whether these constitutional rights actually exist.
The same issue was before the court again within two weeks of
the above-discussed decision." In that case the taxpayer, accompanied
by his accountant, met with a revenue agent and a Special Agent at
the IRS office where he was told that the Service was investigating
another individual and wanted to question him with regard to his
relationship with the other individual. The answers furnished by
the -taxpayer indicated no connection with the individual under in-
vestigation but an examination of the taxpayer's records reflected in-
come that had not been reported. The taxpayer apparently engaged
a lawyer when he was informed that the Service was giving serious
consideration to a prosecution, but 'he claimed that he should 'have
been informed of his right to counsel at his first meeting with the
agents. The court disagreed.
The facts of this case are not nearly as favorable to the taxpayer
as the previous one since he was not under investigation at the time
of the first meeting and he knew the nature and scope of the inquiry.
There is far more evidence here that the taxpayer wilfully cooperated
than existed in Mackiewicz.
The important factor from the standpoint of this discussion is
the court's interpretation of Mathis. The court felt that the rationale
of Mathis "is relevant only where the questioning is conducted in cus-
tody or in circumstances which are similarly inherently compelling; it
does not apply to questioning under other circumstances in which there
are no inherently compulsive pressures to be overcome. ' 32 This lan-
guage suggests that the warning of the right to counsel is required
not only if the person being questioned is in custody but also, if he
is otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.
However, the court went on to reject the view "'that IRS agents must
give the Miranda warnings, even though there is no custodial interro-
gation, if the -investigation has reached the accusatory stage. '33 Thus,
physical custody would appear to be a requirement for -the warnings
in virtually every case although there could conceivably be such com-
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. United States v. Squeri, 398 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1968).
32. Id. at 789.
33. Id. at 790.
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pelling psychological pressures in some factual settings as to make the
Miranda warning mandatory.
On at least two occasions, the Second Circuit has had occasion
to review its decisions relative to the right to counsel in tax investiga-
tions. 4 In neither case does the court appear to waver in its strict
interpretation of custodial interrogation 'since it poi.nted out that the
taxpayer was not "in custody nor restrained of his freedom of action
in 'any significant way.""6  This is not unlike the previous holding
in Mackiewicz.
Joining the Second Circuit, the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit summarily pointed out that it had on several occasions ex-
pressed its view as to the applicability of Miranda to office interviews.
The court continued by noting that the conclusion had been and still
was that the requirements of Miranda do not extend to that type of
activity.'6 This is not really a revelation but the interesting aspect is
the lack of any discussion of Mathis. The only reference thereto was
in a footnote 7 where it was stated that the Supreme Court had ex-
tended Miranda to taxpayers already in jail who are then interviewed
by the agents.
It is difficult to correctly assess the court's interpretation of
Mathis but it would appear that it was being construed rather strictly.
There was no effort to distinguish it from the case at bar which
would indicate that some form of in-custody interrogation was deemed
essential to the extension of Miranda to tax investigations.
In -an even more dogmatic fashion the Fifth Circuit refused to
accept the taxpayer's argument that his sixth amendment right to
counsel had been violated by a failure of -the Special Agent to inform
him of this right at the time of the interview. 8 There could be no
objection to the court's decision since there was no evidence that the
agent knew that this taxpayer was being investigated. He was being
questioned in connection with the affairs of another individual whom
the Service was investigating. The court went on to add, however,
that even if the introduction of the evidence secured during the inter-
view prejudiced the taxpayer, "the short answer is that appellant was
34. United States v. Marcus, 401 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1023 (1969) ; United States v. Dawson, 400 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1023 (1969).
35. United States v. Dawson, 400 F.2d 194, 206. See also United States v. Marcus,
401 F.2d 563, 566 (1968), where the court held that such warning was not required
where the taxpayer "was not in custody and he was fully aware that his activities
were the subject of a tax investigation."
36. Taglianetti v. United States, 398 F.2d 558 (1st Cir. 1968).
37. Id. at 566 n.8.
38. Agoranos v. United States, __ F.2d _., 69-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9316 (5th
Cir. 1969).
[VOL. 14: p. 689
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 4 [1969], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol14/iss4/8
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
not in custody and the Miranda doctrine applies only to in-custody in-
terrogation. '3' The court cited Mathis but did not elaborate in any
fashion.
Two cases have been decided by the Eighth Circuit and, in both,
'the decisions were adverse to the taxpayer.4" In Cohen v. United
States,41 the court carefully examined the holdings of the various cir-
cuits along with some district court cases and concluded "that the
Internal Revenue Service Agents, Revenue or Special, are not required
.to warn taxpayers who are not in custody of their Fifth or Sixth
Amendment rights. ' ' 42 There was no effort to differentiate the nature
of the investigations conducted by the revenue agent from those of
the Special Agent. Neither was there any attempt to establish when
the investigation moved from the investigatory to the accusatory stage.
The basis of the decision was the in-custody factor and the court did
not define nor elaborate upon this term.
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit, in a recent case, followed the logic
of the other circuits and limited the duty of the Service to inform
the taxpayer of his right to counsel to those situations where the in-
dividual has been taken into custody or has otherwise been deprived
of his freedom in some significant manner.43 Again, there was no
effort to define the type of custody or freedom deprivation that would
necessitate the Miranda type of warning.
Throughout all of the cases decided by the Courts of Appeal,
there is a virtual absence of 'the Mathis decision. When it 'has been
mentioned it has been done with the purpose of establishing 'the neces-
sity of in-custody interrogation. Granted that said taxpayer was in-
carcerated at the time of the questioning, it would appear that another
factual part of the case is germane; i.e., the right to counsel was ex-
tended to the in-custody interrogation notwithstanding the fact that
the investigation was in its earliest stages and was clearly of a civil
nature. The Courts of Appeal have focused upon the custody aspect
while relegating the nature and purpose of the investigation to a very
minor role, if given a role at all. The imprisonment was obviously
important to the holding in Mathis and it is extremely unlikely that
a like result would have been reached under those facts in the absence
thereof. However, it does not automatically follow that no Miranda
warning should be given when the case is 'being worked by the In-
39. Id. at 835.
40. Muse v. United States, 405 F.2d 40 (8th Cir. 1968) ; Cohen v. United States,
405 F.2d 34 (8th Cir. 1968).
41. 405 F.2d 34 (8th Cir. 1968).
42. Id. at 40.
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telligence Division and is clearly criminal in nature. When this occurs
the investigation has definitely begun to move toward the accusatory
stage and some consideration should have been given relative to the
point in -time when such warnings are mandatory. If complete reliance
is placed upon the issue of custody, a taxpayer could easily and un-
knowingly make damaging statements and produce harmful documents
in the absence of counsel until he has been charged with a specific
criminal violation. If this be true, he will, in many instances, have
been deprived of the use of counsel when it would have been of the
greatest benefit to him, and, in some cases, this earlier point will
be the only time that counsel could have been of any real benefit.
To place such complete reliance upon custodial interrogation could
effectively deny the taxpayer his right to counsel. Nevertheless, this
is the tenor of the above-discussed -cases. The courts did not use
any language indicating that such right existed in the absence of a
serious deprivation of freedom.
B. District Court Cases
With one exception, the district courts, in post-Mathis cases,
have also adhered to the custodial interrogation approach in denying
that the Miranda type of warning was applicable to non-custody tax
investigations. 44 The lone standout is United States v. Dickerson,4
decided by 'the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
The court held that:
[T]he average citizen, faced with repeated questioning by two
government agents is an ominous situation to say the least. The
Government suggests that the defendant was in no way physically
restrained, but we doubt that he really felt free to walk out on
the investigators from the Internal Revenue Service. In the ab-
sence of sufficient warnings and the assistance of counsel, there
are innumerable factors which act on the taxpayer's mind com-
pelling him to 'co-operate' with the federal authorities. 6
This type of questioning was considered to have curtailed the
taxpayer's freedom of action in a significant manner with the result
that the failure to inform him of the right to counsel amounted to
a deprivation of his constitutional rights. This right to be informed
would apparently date from the time the criminal investigation had
44. United States v. Cymbala, 69-2 U.S. Tax Cas. f 9457 (E.D.N.Y. 1969);
United States v. White, 69-1 U.S. Tax Cas. f 9262 (E.D. Pa. 1968) ; United States
v. Charamella, 69-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9304 (D. Del. 1968) ; United States v. Reing,
22 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 5316 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
45. 69-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9174 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
46. Id.
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RIGHT TO COUNSEL
begun which, in the instant case, was when the Special Agent first
interviewed the taxpayer.
C. Action of the Supreme Court
On at least three occasions the Supreme Court has been re-
quested to grant certiorari in connection with right to counsel in
non-custodial tax investigations and it has been denied in each.47 This
is certainly indicative that the Court intended to limit its decision
in Mathis to custodial interrogations or to situations where the cir-
cumstances of the case would establish that the taxpayer's freedom
of movement had otherwise been seriously impaired. This could be
done by the agents through their conduct, but in 'the usual tax in-
vestigation, Mathis may be of little consequence as long as the Courts
of Appeal continue to 'take the custody approach and .the Supreme
Court continues to deny certiorari.
D. Present Position of the Service
In November of 1968, the Service announced that it was revising
its procedure with regard to advising a taxpayer of his rights 'when
interviewed by a Special Agent. The Special Agent is "required to
identify himself, describe his function, and advise the taxpayer that
anything he says may be used against him."4  He must "also tell
the taxpayer that 'he cannot be compelled to incriminate himself by
answering any questions or producing any documents, iand that he
has the right to seek the assi'stance of an attorney before responding. '49
No change was made in the instructions for interviewing a person
in custody where he is also told that an attorney will be 'appointed if
he cannot afford counsel.' 0
This gives some indication of the Service's concept of its in-
vestigative functions. By requiring the Special Agent to -inform the
taxpayer of 'his rights at their initial contact, the Service apparently
considers that the process has taken on the character of a criminal
investigation and can no longer be treated as a routine civil audit.
While all Intelligence Division investigations do not culminate in a
prosecution of the taxpayer, it is clear -that -the thrust of -such investi-
gations 'is for the purpose of establishing whether a criminal infrac-
tion has occurred. As such, they are criminal in nature.
47. United States v. Marcus, 393 U.S. 1023 (1969); United States v. Dawson,
393 U.S. 1023 (1969) ; United States v. Mackiewicz, 393 U.S. 923 (1968).
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III. CONCLUSION
While the issue of the right to counsel should not arise as fre-
quently in the future as a result of the warning to be given by the
Special Agent, it is inevitable that it will be forgotten or omitted in
some instances. Nor is -there any reason why the Service could not
delete the right to counsel advice from its warning. In either event it
is unlikely that the taxpayer can expect much assistance from Mathis
unless the investigation or interrogation is conducted in such a fashion
as to substantially deprive him of his freedom of movement. Such
in-custody questioning -appears essential under 'the post-Mathis deci-
sions notwithstanding the fact that the investigation may really be
criminal in nature. Therefore, Mathis may actually cause some courts
to ,hold against the taxpayer in situations where they would otherwise
have been more prone to examine all aspects of the investigation to
see if it had moved -to the accusatory level. Such a result would be
unfortunate but it is possible.
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